Guía docente de Teoría de Juegos (M56/56/1/5)

Curso 2022/2023
Fecha de aprobación por la Comisión Académica 15/07/2022

Máster

Máster Universitario en Economía / Economics

Módulo

Módulo II: Segundo Trimestre

Rama

Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas

Centro Responsable del título

International School for Postgraduate Studies

Semestre

Primero

Créditos

4

Tipo

Optativa

Tipo de enseñanza

Presencial

Profesorado

  • Elena Molis Bañales
  • Jorge Alcalde Unzu

Tutorías

Elena Molis Bañales

Email
  • Primer semestre
    • Miercoles 10:00 a 14:00 (Empre. Desp. B326)
    • Miércoles 10:00 a 14:00 (Empre. Desp. B326)
    • Jueves 10:00 a 12:00 (Empre. Desp. B326)
  • Segundo semestre
    • Martes 10:00 a 14:00 (Empre. Desp. B326)
    • Miércoles 10:00 a 12:00 (Empre. Desp. B326)
    • Miercoles 10:00 a 12:00 (Empre. Desp. B326)

Breve descripción de contenidos (Según memoria de verificación del Máster)

  • Normal-form games
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Extensive-form games
  • Subgame Perfect equilibrium
  • Repeated games
  • Bayesian games.
  • Matching theory

Prerrequisitos y/o Recomendaciones

Basic knowledge of mathematics (algebra, calculus, probability,...) and microeconomics.

Competencias

Competencias Básicas

  • CB6. Poseer y comprender conocimientos que aporten una base u oportunidad de ser originales en desarrollo y/o aplicación de ideas, a menudo en un contexto de investigación.
  • CB7. Que los estudiantes sepan aplicar los conocimientos adquiridos y su capacidad de resolución de problemas en entornos nuevos o poco conocidos dentro de contextos más amplios (o multidisciplinares) relacionados con su área de estudio.
  • CB8. Que los estudiantes sean capaces de integrar conocimientos y enfrentarse a la complejidad de formular juicios a partir de una información que, siendo incompleta o limitada, incluya reflexiones sobre las responsabilidades sociales y éticas vinculadas a la aplicación de sus conocimientos y juicios.
  • CB9. Que los estudiantes sepan comunicar sus conclusiones y los conocimientos y razones últimas que las sustentan a públicos especializados y no especializados de un modo claro y sin ambigüedades.
  • CB10. Que los estudiantes posean las habilidades de aprendizaje que les permitan continuar estudiando de un modo que habrá de ser en gran medida autodirigido o autónomo.

Resultados de aprendizaje (Objetivos)

  • To identify the basic concepts of Game Theory and its most prominent economic applications.
  • To analyze a strategic situation and obtain good predictions about economic agents’ behavior.
  • To model any strategic situation as a formal problem of Game Theory by using the concepts learnt along the course.
  • To apply the most suitable solution concepts of Game Theory to each particular situation.
  • To determine the variables that affect agents’ behavior in a particular strategic situation.
  • To understand and use the information of the behavior in a strategic environment

Programa de contenidos Teóricos y Prácticos

Teórico

PART A: Basics on (non-cooperative) game theory

  • Strategic games with complete information.     
    • Chapter 1: Solution Concepts
    • Chapter 2: Mixed strategy equilibrium
  • Strategic games with incomplete information.   
    • Chapter 3: Bayesian games
  • Extensive games with complete information.    
    • Chapter 4: Extensive games with perfect information.           
    • Chapter 5: Extensive games with imperfect information.
    • Chapter 6: Repeated games

PART B: Matching: Theory and Applications

  • Chapter 1: House allocation
  • Chapter 2: Assignments of doctors to hospitals
  • Chapter 3: Assignment and exchange of kidneys for transplants.
  • Chapter 4: School Choice

Práctico

Problem sets 

  • Practice 1. Exercises on Strategic games with complete information.
  • Practice 2. Exercises on Dynamic games with complete information.
  • Practice 3. Exercises on Extensive games with complete information
  • Practice 4: Exercises on Matching Theory and Allocation

Seminars

  • Each student will present an individual  work based on the application of game theoretical concepts to real economic issues.
  • Prominent researchers on Game Theory will present their recent projects.

Bibliografía

Bibliografía fundamental

  • Osborne, M. J. (2004). An introduction to game theory (Vol. 3, No. 3). New York: Oxford University Press.

Bibliografía complementaria

  • Binmore, K. (2007). Game theory: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
  • Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1991). Game theory. MIT Press Books, 1.
  • Gibbons, R. (1992). A primer in game theory. FT Prentice Hall Publisher, London.
  • Leyton-Brown, K., & Shoham, Y. (2008). Essentials of game theory: A concise multidisciplinary introduction. Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 2(1), 1-88.
  • Myerson, R. B. (2013). Game theory. Harvard university press.
  • Osborne, M. J., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A course in game theory. MIT press.
  • Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1990). Two-sided matching, volume 18 of Econometric Society Monographs.

Metodología docente

Evaluación (instrumentos de evaluación, criterios de evaluación y porcentaje sobre la calificación final.)

Evaluación Ordinaria

Article 17 of the UGR Assessment Policy and Regulations establishes that the ordinary assessment session (convocatoria ordinaria) will preferably be based on the continuous assessment of students, except for those who have been granted the right to a single final assessment (evaluación única final), which is an assessment method that only takes a final exam into account.

  • Exam on Part A (50%)
    • This exam will be a test questionnaire.
    • Wrong answers will penalize.
  • Individual project and its presentation on applications of some of the models analyzed during the course (25%)
  • Problem set on PART B (25%)

Evaluación Extraordinaria

Article 19 of the UGR Assessment Policy and Regulations establishes that students who have not passed a course in the ordinary assessment session (convocatoria ordinaria) will have access to an extraordinary assessment session (convocatoria extraordinaria). All students may take part in this extraordinary assessment session, regardless of whether or not they have followed continuous assessment activities. In this way, students who have not carried out continuous assessment activities will have the opportunity to obtain 100% of their mark by means of an exam and/or assignment.
 

  • Exam on Parts A and B (100%) 
    • It will be a test questionnaire.
    • Wrong answers will penalize.

Evaluación única final

Article 8 of the UGR Assessment Policy and Regulations establishes that students who are unable to follow continuous assessment methods due to justifiable reasons shall have recourse to a single final assessment (evaluación única final), which is an assessment method that only takes a final exam into account.

In order to opt for a single final assessment (evaluación única final), students must send a request, using the corresponding online procedure, to the coordinator of the master’s programme, in the first two weeks of the course or in the two weeks following their enrolment (if the enrolment has taken place after the classes have already begun). The coordinator will communicate this information to the relevant teaching staff members, citing and verifying the reasons why the student is unable to follow the continuous assessment system.

In this case, the assessment will comprise:

  • Exam on Parts A and B (100%).
    • It will be a test questionnaire.
    • Wrong answers will penalize.

Información adicional